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Preface
The export-led growth paradigm is a development strategy
aimed at growing productive capacity by focusing on foreign
markets. It rose to prominence in the late 1970s and became part
of a new consensus among economists about the benefits of eco-
nomic openness. 
According to Thomas I. Palley, this paradigm is no longer
relevant because of changed conditions in both emerging-mar-
ket (EM) and developed economies. He outlines the stages of the
export-led growth paradigm leading to its adoption worldwide,
as well as the various critiques of this agenda that have become
increasingly prescient. He concludes that we should reduce
reliance on strategies aimed at attracting export-oriented foreign
direct investment (FDI) and institute a new  paradigm based on
a domestic demand–led growth model. Otherwise, the global
economy is likely to experience asymmetric stagnation and
increased economic tensions between EM and industrialized
economies.
Export-led growth was purported to generate a win-win
outcome for developing and industrialized economies based on
the principle of comparative advantage. Arguments about the
benefits of trade and economic openness played an important
role in propelling the new agenda of international economic
integration because they dovetailed with the economic interests
of large corporations—globalization. This alliance drove the
expansion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
the establishment of the World Trade Organization.
The export-led growth model evolved to fit changing global
circumstances and the conditions of individual countries. The
various stages relied on undervalued exchange rates, the need for
foreign technology, export-production platforms for foreign
multinationals, the suppression of wages and social standards,
and partnerships between countries and multinational corpora-
tions, as well as the managed undervaluation of exchange rates
(capital controls), higher import tariffs, and joint ventures, in
order to build an indigenous (national) technological base. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created
a free-trade production zone that unified developed and devel-
oping economies for the first time. However, its template dam-
ages the developed economies via deindustrialization, creates
international financial imbalances, and undermines the wage-
productivity growth link. In effect, the NAFTA model has cre-
ated a divided world, with consumers in the North and producers
in the South.
The financial crash and accompanying Great Recession has
created a global demand shortage and stagnation in the industri-
alized economies. Moreover, the positive factors related to export-
led growth strategies are likely to prove increasingly ephemeral.
There are several structural problems such as the debt saturation
of US consumers and the fact that EM exports are sabotaging
the recovery of the industrialized economies. 
According to Palley, China is unlikely to become the global
engine of growth because its export-growth model is that of an
assembler who focuses on supplying consumers in industrialized
countries. And because of its size, China is siphoning FDI and
demand away from other EM economies. Thus, its entrance onto
the global stage has introduced South–South competition to the
traditional dynamic of North versus South. In addition, multi-
national corporations have created a “race to the bottom” dynamic
where developing countries undermine one another to gain
competitive advantage. As a result, Palley concludes, no single
country or region can act as the global engine of growth, so all
countries and regions must pull together. 
A domestic demand–led strategy includes building social
safety nets, raising and linking wages to productivity growth,
increasing public infrastructure investment (as well as public
goods such as health care and education), and rebalancing tax
structures. In addition, the international economy needs to end
undervalued exchange rates and adopt a system of managed rates
aimed at avoiding global trade imbalances; implement labor,
environmental, and social standards; and limit incentives to
attract export-oriented FDI. However, agreement on such rules
and standards is unlikely, says Palley, given the political and
structural obstacles.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
August 2011Public Policy Brief, No. 119 4
Introduction
For the past 30 years, development policy has been dominated by
the paradigm of export-led growth. That paradigm is part of a
consensus among economists about the benefits of economic
openness, a consensus used to justify globalization.
The Great Recession has surfaced contradictions that were
always inherent in export-led growth and globalization, and the
global economy now confronts a troubling outlook of signifi-
cant demand shortage. In developed economies, the shortage is
explicit in high rates of unemployment and large output gaps.
In emerging market (EM) economies, it is implicit in their
reliance on export markets. EM economies differ from develop-
ing economies in that they are predominantly middle income
(China and India are considered EM economies because they
have attracted significant foreign direct investment), while the
latter are low-income countries with limited industrialization.
This paper argues that the case for trade openness and
export-led growth was always oversimplified and oversold.1 In
part due to the widespread turn to openness and export-led
growth, the global economy now confronts an extended period
of asymmetric stagnation marked by slower growth in EM
economies, stagnation in developed economies, and increased
economic tensions between EM and developed economies. 
The Rise of Export-led Growth
The export-led growth paradigm rose to prominence in the late
1970s, when it replaced the import-substitution paradigm that
had dominated development policy thinking (especially in Latin
America) after World War II. Export-led growth is a develop-
ment strategy aimed at growing productive capacity by focusing
on foreign markets. It is part of a new consensus among econo-
mists about the benefits of economic openness.
This new consensus rests on a fusion of three strains of argu-
ment, as illustrated in Figure 1. The first strain, based on the
Hecksher–Ohlin–Samuelson comparative advantage theory, is
about the gains from trade between economies with different
capital-labor ratios (Ohlin 1933; Samuelson 1948; Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson 1980). The second strain (political econ-
omy) concerns the benefits of openness for controlling rent seek-
ing, a problem associated with import-substitution development
that elicited strong criticism (Krueger 1974). The third strain,
which developed later, is about the benefits of trade openness for
growth. It claims that trade encourages technology diffusion and
knowledge spillovers that contribute to faster productivity growth
(Grossman and Helpman 1991).
Export-led growth represents a subsidiary branch within
this new consensus that applies to developing countries. The
argument is that self-conscious policy focused on external mar-
kets helps capture the economic benefits of openness (for develop-
ing countries) by encouraging best-practice adoption, promoting
product development, and exposing firms to competition. The
success of the four East Asian “tiger” economies (South Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) appeared to provide empir-
ical support for this argument.
According to economists, export-led growth generates a
win-win outcome for developing and industrialized economies.
All benefit from the global application of the principle of com-
parative advantage, while developing countries realize added
benefits, such as best-practice adoption, from an external focus.
Moreover, industrialized economies supposedly benefit even if
developing countries subsidize their exports in order to win
additional export sales, because subsidized exports are essentially
a gift to the countries receiving those exports. This claim, how-
ever, rests on two highly questionable assumptions: there is no
long-term dynamic cost to industries displaced by such subsi-
dies, and there is scarcity of resources owing to full employment
(i.e., no Keynesian unemployment).
These arguments about the benefits of trade and economic
openness played an important role in advancing the new agenda
of international economic integration, since they dovetailed with
the economic interests of large corporations looking to establish
a new global economic structure (globalization). That created a
corporate-elite opinion alliance, which drove expansion of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the subse-
quent establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1996. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
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together played a special role in furthering the new agenda in
developing countries—which needed financial assistance after
the oil shocks of the 1970s—since access to these agencies’ funds
was conditional on governments embracing the openness agenda.
Critiques of the New Openness Agenda
Though the new “openness” agenda swept academic economics,
there was always opposition and this opposition has become
increasingly prescient. Figure 2 identifies four strains of critique
regarding the openness paradigm. The first is the comparative-
advantage (neoclassical) critique, which focuses on potential
pathologies of trade liberalization. These pathologies include
Harry Johnson’s (1954, 1955) terms-of-trade-deterioration cri-
tique; Jagdish Bhagwati’s (1958) immiserizing-growth critique,
which  extended  Johnson’s  work  within  a  dynamic  context;
Wolfgang F. Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson’s (1941) critique of
trade and income distribution; and critiques of the unintended
negative effects of trade liberalization in a world of market
imperfections (e.g., see Brewer 1985). However, this internal cri-
tique is a collection of rare pathologies and, in many regards, a
confusing distraction, since, unlike more systemic critiques, it
accepts rather than challenges the fundamental logic of neoclas-
sical trade theory.2
The second strain—the Keynesian critique—has its roots in
macroeconomics and Keynes’s rejection of comparative advan-
tage (Milberg 2002; Prasch 1996). In a Keynesian world of demand
shortage, trade can lower domestic demand and lead to reduced
output, employment, and national welfare. An implicit corollary
proposition in a Keynesian world is that export subsidies are not
a gift but may instead poach demand and employment.
This critique also makes exchange rates a trade issue, since
undervalued exchange rates impact demand by altering the rel-
ative price of imports and exports. Classical open-economy
macroeconomics—the twin of neoclassical trade theory—asserts
that any employment effects of undervalued exchange rates are
at worst temporary, since monetary factors are supposedly neu-
tral. Either the real exchange rate adjusts to offset the effects of
money, or the money supply adjusts via the specie-flow mecha-
nism in response to trade deficits. However, this logic falls apart
if there are hysteresis effects related to patterns of demand and
the organization of production (Palley 2003a). In that case,
exchange rates are non-neutral in both the short and long run,
and these non-neutralities make the benefits of trade contingent
on appropriate exchange-rate arrangements. Absent such arrange-
ments, trade can reduce economic welfare.
The Keynesian demand-shortage argument also carries over
to situations with economies of scale, where measures that increase
demand (including protection) can increase exports by lowering
the average cost of producers. This provides a rationale for strate-
gic trade policy that departs from free trade (Krugman 1984).
The third strain is labeled “kicking away the ladder,” after
the book of the same name by Ha-Joon Chang (2002). This cri-
tique traces directly to the post–World War II import-substitution
school of thought, arguing that trade protection, industrial pol-
icy, and the ability to conduct macroeconomic policy are neces-
sary for successful development. According to Chang, no country
has successfully industrialized without such policies. Whereas
the Keynesian critique of openness is generic and holds for both
developed and EM economies, the kicking-away-the-ladder cri-
tique applies only to EM economies.
The fourth strain is specifically about export-led growth,
and  it  consists  of  three  elements.  The  first  is  labeled  the
“Robinson beggar-thy-neighbor critique,” so named after Joan
Robinson’s (1947) observations about macroeconomic mercan-
tilism. Her Keynesian argument stems from the competitive
devaluation experience of the 1930s. The logic is that countries
trying to export their way out of a demand shortage implicitly
harm their neighbors by poaching demand and employment.
Applied to export-led development, the Robinson critique sug-
gests a fallacy of composition, and that developing countries may
crowd out one another’s exports (Blecker 2000; Palley 2003b;
Blecker and Razmi 2010).
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The second element is labeled the “Prebisch–Singer cri-
tique.” It focuses on the supply and price effects of export-led
growth, in contrast to the Robinson critique that focuses on the
demand and quantity effects. Sixty years ago, Raul Prebisch
(1950) and Hans Singer (1950) identified a problem of declining
terms of trade for commodity-exporting countries. Today, the
problem has shifted from commodities to manufactured goods.
Countries that engage in export-led growth may exacerbate the
problem by increasing the global supply of such goods (Sarkar
and Singer 1991; Kaplinsky 1993; Sapsford and Singer 1998).
The third element is labeled the “structural Keynesian cri-
tique” (Palley 2002, 2004). The argument here is that export-led
growth promotes economic structures that deliver low-quality
growth  and  prevent  the  development  of  deep  prosperity.
Development that is externally focused has shallow roots—a
phenomenon exemplified by export processing zones such as
Mexico’s maquiladoras. Internationally, export-led growth pro-
motes a race to the bottom, as countries try to gain competitive
advantage by any means. That results in wage suppression; dis-
regard for labor and environmental standards, and workplace
conditions; and weak regulation aimed at pleasing capital. 
A Brief History of Export-led Growth
The last 30 years have seen tremendous spread of the export-led
growth paradigm. The model has evolved to fit changing global
circumstances and the conditions of individual countries. This
evolution involved four stages. Stage I was kicked off by Germany
and Japan, and ran from 1945 to 1970. Both countries had an
indigenous industrial base and export growth was driven by an
undervalued exchange rate. Growth also benefitted from US aid
for postwar reconstruction and in response to the Cold War.
Stage II ran from 1970 to 1985 and applies to the four East
Asian “tiger” economies. Once again, during this stage countries
relied on an undervalued exchange rate but now there was need
for acquisition of foreign technology via strategic planning. 
Stage III holds for countries in South East Asia (Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia) as well as Latin America (Mexico) in
the 1980s and 1990s. The major change from stage II is that these
countries turned themselves into export-production platforms
for foreign multinationals rather than developing their own
indigenous industrial capacity. This new strategy was made fea-
sible by the increased mobility of technology and capital. Its key
elements  included  integration  into  the  global  economy,  an
undervalued exchange rate, and the suppression of wages and
social standards. The goal was to enhance international compet-
itiveness and attract multinational corporations (MNCs) as a site
for foreign direct investment (FDI) that was export oriented. The
benefits, however, have been elusive.
The third stage represents the beginning of the modern era
of corporate globalization, where export-led growth is no longer
a purely national strategy but a partnership between developing
countries, MNCs, and developed countries. Governments and
MNCs promoted the new system using the traditional language
of free trade, claiming that their goal was to create a global mar-
ketplace. The real goal, however, was not to promote traditional
trade but to create a global production zone where corporations
could establish export-production platforms for markets in devel-
oped countries. 
Mexico’s engagement with export-led growth epitomizes this
stage. Trade liberalization began in 1986, and it set the country on
the path toward creation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. The inauguration of NAFTA was
marked by a massive devaluation of the peso vis-à-vis the US dol-
lar, and thus provided Mexico with an undervalued currency.
NAFTA is the template for the new model, and it is significant
from a historical standpoint. By unifying the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, NAFTA created a free-trade production
zone that unified developed and developing economies for the
first time. This template was then extended globally via the estab-
lishment of the WTO in 1996, followed by the organization’s
admission of China in 2001.
There are three important features of the NAFTA–corporate
globalization model. First, it promotes trade, but not in the clas-
sical sense of balanced exports and imports. Second, it promotes
a new type of export-led growth based on relocating existing pro-
duction  and  diverting  new  investment,  which  benefits  EM
economies by creating jobs, transferring technology, and reliev-
ing balance-of-payment constraints on growth; these economies,
however, do not own the industrialization process like those in
stages I and II. And third, this model does considerable damage
to developed economies via deindustrialization and the creation
of international financial imbalances, as well as undermining the
wage–productivity growth link—which, in turn, undermines the
coherence of the domestic income and demand generation process. 
Stage IV extends and augments the stage III model, as exem-
plified by China, making three major adjustments to Mexico’s
NAFTA model. First, it is characterized by asymmetric globalLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
engagement, with China maintaining greater tariffs on imports.
Second, there is managed undervaluation of the exchange rate,
which is maintained with capital controls. Third, there is a strat-
egy for building an indigenous (national) technological base via
forced technology sharing, joint ventures (where MNCs may be
minority shareholders), and technology theft. Prime examples
of this new approach to technology transfer are China’s banking
and automobile sectors.
MNCs have also changed their strategy by engaging in joint
ventures, as well as licensing and sourcing from foreign produc-
ers instead of owning facilities. This is the price of entry into
China, where corporations hope to be paid back by future prof-
its stemming from its large market. Licensing and joint ventures
also benefit corporations by reducing their capital investment.
However, the basic structure of dependence on multinationals
for exports remains intact, making stage IV distinct from stages
I and II. This dependence is illustrated in Table 1, which decom-
poses Chinese exports and imports in terms of firm ownership.
Foreign-owned firms accounted for 50.4 percent of Chinese
exports in 2005, and the proportion rises to 76.7 percent when
joint ventures are included along with the foreign-owned firms.
The Fall of Export-led Growth
Export-led growth has been a relatively successful development
strategy for the past several decades, but there have also been
clear signs of fraying. Though China has done well, stage III par-
ticipants (like Mexico) have been less successful. Table 2 shows
that China has had rapid growth in terms of GDP, labor pro-
ductivity (due to rapid capital accumulation), and total factor
productivity (TFP), reflecting a dynamic economy characterized
by technological advance. In contrast, Mexico has not recovered
its strong economic performance of the 1960–80 period. GDP
growth has been sluggish, labor productivity is unchanged, and
TFP growth has been negative.
Going Forward
So far, this analysis has looked backward. In this section, we peer
into the future. 
There are reasons to believe that the export-led growth strat-
egy is exhausted because of changed conditions in both devel-
oping and developed economies. The financial crash of 2008 and
the accompanying Great Recession represent a watershed event
that has created an overarching structural condition of global
demand shortage. The US economy is debt saturated, Europe is
constrained by fiscal austerity and wedded to export-led growth
via Germany, and Japan continues to suffer from weak internal
demand and an aging population, while remaining hooked on
export-oriented growth. This combination augurs for stagnation
in the industrialized economies.
EM economies continue to grow on the back of export-led
growth strategies, but the positive factors are likely to prove
increasingly ephemeral. They have benefitted significantly from
the global recovery following the collapse of trade in 2009, higher
commodity prices (further strengthened by the view of com-
modities as a speculative hedge against inflation), and interest-
rate compression produced by the crisis. Although this last benefit
will likely be permanent, the trade bounce is a one-off, and the
prospect of stagnation will likely take the inflation premium out of
commodity prices. EM economies as a group face structural
impediments that make collective export-led growth impossible. 
Problem number one is the debt saturation of US con-
sumers. The export-led growth model relies on robust consumer
markets in developed economies (particularly the United States)
to buy exports and justify FDI. These markets were artificially
strong for 25 years, fueled by rising debt and asset-price inflation.
Table 1 Chinese Exports and Imports by Firm Ownership, 
2005 (in percent)
Source: Manova and Zhang 2008
All  State- Private  Joint Foreign-
Firms owned Domestic Ventures owned
Exports 100 10.3 13.1 26.3 50.4
Imports 100 21.7 7.1 24.1 47.2
Table 2 Relative Growth of Mexico (Stage III) and China 
(Stage IV) (in percent)
Source: Palma 2010
GDP Labor Total Factor
Productivity Productivity 
1950– 1980– 1950– 1980– 1960– 1980– 1990–
1980 2008 1980 2008 1980 1989 2004
Mexico 6.4 2.6 3.1 -0.1 1.6 -2.4 -0.6
China 4.9 8.5 2.0 6.7 0.6 4.2 4.7Public Policy Brief, No. 119 8
This pattern was unsustainable and is now over, leaving a hole in
the model’s logic. 
Problem number two is the relative size of the EM economies.
They now constitute such a large share of the global economy that
their exports are sabotaging the recovery of the industrialized
economies, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the evolu-
tion of developed-economy and developing- and EM-economy
shares of global GDP. The latter share rose from 39.1 percent in
1980 to 50.8 percent in 2008, making it difficult for the group to
continue to rely on export-led growth. Table 4 shows the chang-
ing composition of world trade. Non-OECD country exports rose
from 25.1 percent in 1995 to 36.4 percent in 2008, while imports
climbed more slowly—from 26.2 percent to 33.2 percent. As a
bloc, these countries run trade surpluses and are still significantly
dependent on exports for growth, despite their larger size.3
In effect, the NAFTA globalization model has created a
divided world where consumers are in the North and producers
are in the South. In the era of globalization, expanding productive
capacity is relatively easy, owing to technological innovations that
have increased the mobility of capital and managerial expertise.
The structural Keynesian challenge is to create an income and
demand generation process that supports productive capacity
(Palley 2006). Furthermore, China is unlikely to become the
engine of growth, since its model is that of an assembler focused
on supplying the consumers of industrialized countries. Figure 3
shows a stylized representation of the new China-centric global
supply chain, wherein East Asian countries export to China and
China exports to the industrialized economies.
This trade pattern is supported by Table 5, which shows the
changing composition of East Asian exports. The share of East
Asian exports to China has been rising, reflecting China’s role as
an assembler rather than a manufacturer.  However, the share of
Chinese exports to East Asia has been falling, reflecting China’s
reliance on consumers in industrialized economies.  
The third problem is the declining relative price of manu-
factured goods. The widespread adoption of export-led growth
is contributing to a new Prebisch–Singer declining terms-of-trade
problem similar to the one that afflicted commodity-producing
developing countries in the first half of the 20th century. During
that period, the relative price of primary commodities fell as the
supply increased. Now the problem is the increased supply of
low-technology manufactured goods (Sarkar and Singer 1991).
Problem number four is what globalization critics term “the
global race to the bottom.” Because it is easy for MNCs to shift
production between countries, they have created a “race to the
bottom” dynamic in which developing countries undermine one
another in an attempt to gain competitive advantage by sup-
pressing wages, labor, and business regulations; minimizing envi-
ronmental and social standards; shifting the tax burden from
Japan








Table 4 The Changing Composition of World Trade 
(in percent)
Source: OECD Economic Outlook S7 Database, June 2010
1995 2000 2005 2008
Exports G7 48.9 46.4 40.1 36.4
OECD 74.9 72.2 66.9 63.6
Non-OECD 25.1 27.8 33.1 36.4
Imports G7 48.7 50.0 45.0 40.1
OECD 73.8 75.0 71.1 66.8
Non-OECD 26.2 25.0 28.9 33.2
Table 3 The Changing Composition of Global GDP 
(in billions of 2011 dollars)
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,
October 2007; and author’s calculations
1980 1990 2000 2008
World 12,961 26,988 45,205 77,109
Developed Economies 7,896 16,242 26,071 37,900
(in percent) (60.9) (60.2) (57.7) (49.2)
Developing and EM 5,064 10,746 19,133 39,210
Economies (in percent) (39.1) (39.8) (42.3) (50.8)Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
capital income to labor income; creating extrajudicial export
processing zones; and promoting competitive devaluations that
create financial instability. But since all countries do it, no one
gains significant competitive advantage. Instead, this (destruc-
tive) dynamic undermines standards, institutions, and income
equality, as well as the wage growth needed for deeply rooted
economic development. The only beneficiaries are the MNCs,
which gain from higher profit margins.
The fifth and final problem is China’s adoption of an export-
led growth strategy. Because its labor force is so large, its wages
so low, and the prospect of producing for its large domestic mar-
ket so commercially attractive, China is siphoning FDI and
demand away from other EM economies and undermining their
industrialization and development. China poses two problems
for other developing and EM economies: its size blocks the access
of newcomers to the traditional development ladder, and its
entrance onto the global stage has introduced South–South com-
petition to the global marketplace. That explains why the bene-
fits of export-led growth have been so limited for stage III
countries like Mexico. 
One benefit for developing economies is that urbanization
in China is likely to create persistent upward pressure on com-
modity prices. Urbanization requires energy resources for power
and transportation, as well as using commodities such as iron
ore, copper, and lumber in construction. This is a mixed blessing,
however. First, it will only benefit EM and developing economies
that have these resources. Second, it stands to create the “Dutch
disease”  by  appreciating  exchange  rates—something  that  is
already clearly visible in Brazil and Chile. This undermines
industrialization and development, and could re-create an inter-
national division of labor paralleling that created by British
industrialization in the 19th century. 
The Case for Domestic Demand–led Growth
The implication of the above arguments is that the export-led
growth paradigm is exhausted for developing countries and risks
doing serious harm to the global economy. This means there
needs to be a shift toward domestic demand–led growth while
maintaining  exports,  which  are  always  needed  to  pay  for
imported inputs and finished goods that are not produced
domestically. It also means reducing reliance on strategies aimed
at attracting export-oriented FDI.
The imperatives for successful domestic demand–led growth
are clear (Palley 2002): 
(a) Build social safety nets that diminish the need for 
precautionary saving.
(b)Raise and link wages to productivity growth by imple-
menting a minimum wage, improving labor protections,
and increasing collective bargaining via unions.
(c) Increase public infrastructure investment and fill the
backlog resulting from 25 years of neglect imposed by the 
neoliberal Washington Consensus development model.
(d)Increase the provision of public goods such as health 
care and education.
(e) Rebalance tax structures by increasing taxes on 
higher-income groups and decreasing taxes on lower-
income groups.
In the international economy, there is the need to:
(a) End undervalued exchange rates and adopt a system of 
managed rates aimed at avoiding global trade imbalances.
(b)Abandon policies of international labor competition 
by implementing global labor standards.
(c) Implement global environmental and social standards 
that block international competition based on environ-
mental degradation and social exploitation.
(d)Limit incentives to attract export-oriented FDI.
Though it is clear what is needed, there are tremendous polit-
ical obstacles to change. EM economies are unwilling to give up
a strategy that has worked so well, and paying transition costs now
in order to avoid hypothetically higher costs later is not politi-
cally compelling. There is also resentment that EM economies are
Table 5 The Changing Pattern of East Asian Trade
(in percent)
Source: M. Haddad, “Trade Integration in East Asia: The Role of China and
Production Networks,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4160,
March 2007
East Asia China
Exporter 1990–1994 2000–2004 1990–1994 2000–2004
East Asia 44.1 49.0 6.4 11.1
China 60.5 45.3 N/A N/APublic Policy Brief, No. 119 10
asked to change in spite of having much lower per capita income
than the advanced economies. Furthermore, no individual coun-
try has an incentive to abandon export-led growth and adopt the
policy measures of a domestic demand–led strategy for fear of
being the only country to do so. In effect, there is a collective-
action problem: the only way to ensure a global shift toward a
new demand-led growth model is to establish and enforce mul-
tilateral rules on exchange rates, as well as acceptable standards
on labor, tax, and environmental competition. Agreement on
such rules and standards, however, is unlikely. 
In addition to political obstacles to change, there are struc-
tural obstacles. Once countries embark on export-led growth, it
seems to be very difficult to change strategies. Germany and Japan
still focus on exports and consistently run large trade surpluses
50 years after adopting the export-led model and long after they
became top-tier, high-income countries. One possible explana-
tion is that export-oriented industries gain political control after
acquiring dominance, while the institutions and political inter-
ests supporting domestic demand–led growth remain weak.
Conclusions and Predictions
The above analysis suggests four conclusions, which support three
predictions. The first conclusion is that the export-led growth
paradigm is exhausted because of changed conditions in both
EM and developed economies. The second is that EM economies
are mistaken in their belief that they can continue to grow col-
lectively on the basis of export-led growth; rather, this policy will
impede economic recovery in the developed countries. The third
conclusion sees a need for a major recalibration of the global
economy, whereby export-led growth is replaced by a new para-
digm: domestic demand–led growth. The final conclusion is that
no single country or region can act as the locomotive of global
growth because globalization has diversified economic activity
to the extent that all countries and regions must pull together.
These conclusions support the following three predictions.
For political reasons, it is highly unlikely that EM countries will
shift away from export-led growth, nor will the international com-
munity agree on the arrangements needed to make the domestic
demand–led growth paradigm work. Once a country has adopted
an export-led growth model, it appears that it is nearly impossi-
ble to abandon it. The second prediction is that failure to recali-
brate the global economy is likely to produce a political backlash
in the industrialized countries; in particular, the United States,
where the public has lost its political patience because trade and
exchange-rate adjustments by China have been delayed too long.
The third prediction is that the global economy is likely to expe-
rience asymmetric stagnation marked by slower growth in EM
economies, stagnation in developed economies, and increased
economic tensions between EM and industrialized economies.
Notes
1. This brief is based on Working Paper no. 675. 
2. Progressive activists sometimes appeal to arguments such as
the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem to criticize free trade.
This is a dangerous tactic, since it implicitly accepts the logic
of neoclassical trade theory and its claims about the benefits of
trade from applying the principle of comparative advantage.
3. In Table 4, “non-OECD” is a proxy for EM and developing
economies. However, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey are
members of the OECD. If their exports and imports were
subtracted from the OECD and added to the non-OECD
list, the trade share of developing economies would increase
further.
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